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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PRECEDING 
Appellants are Carroll C- and Shirley Nichols, 
husband and wife who filed separate claims in an Amended 
Complaint as Third Party Plaintiffs against Second Third Party 
Defendant State of Utah, Appellee. 
First Interstate Bank of Utah filed the original 
action against Carroll C. Nichols on a note, but is not a 
party to this appeal. C & G Transportation Corporation 
previously filed for bankruptcy and is not a party to this 
appeal. 
This appeal is by each Third Party Plaintiff on 
their individual judgments against Second Third Party 
Defendant State of Utah granted by the Third District Court on 
May 31, 1990. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked by Appellants 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1953). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Plaintiff Shirley Nichols Was Not Entitled, as 
a Matter of Law, to a Claim of Loss 
Representing One-Half Interest in Checks Paid 
From the Joint Family Bank Account in the 
Alleged Amount of $39,692.46. 
1 
The standard for review is that Plaintiff must show 
that the factor determinations of the trial court were 
"clearly erroneous". Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
II. Plaintiff Shirley Nichols is not Entitled to 
Prejudgment Interest. 
A, The Unfair Competition in Ridesharing Act 
does not allow for prejudgment interest. 
The standard of review is that the Plaintiffs must 
show that the trial court was incorrect in its determinations. 
Carter v. Utah Power & Light, 146 U.A.R. 7 (Utah 1990). 
B. Plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment 
interest even if allowable under the 
unfair competition in ride sharing act. 
The standard of review is that the Plaintiffs must 
show the trial court's determination was "clearly erroneous", 
because of the factual determinations of the trial court that 
pre-judgment interest is inappropriate and Plaintiffs' claims 
too speculative. Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
III. The Claim by Plaintiff Shirley Nichols For 
$58,077.64, as Set Forth in Point III of 
Plaintiff's Brief (p. 31) is a Non-Meritless 
Claim to be Ignored by This Court as Having 
Been First Raised on Appeal, and Further 
Misrepresented as an Alleged Binding Admission 
and Commitment by the State. 
This claim is raised for the first time on appeal, 
and therefore, there is no standard of review. To the extent 
it seems to overrule the trial court's factor determination of 
2 
loss, the standard of review is that the Plaintiffs must show 
that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous. Rule 
52, Utah R. Civ. P, 
IV. Plaintiffs are not Entitled to Judgment 
Interest From June 20, 1988. 
This issue was not raised below as it deals with 
post-judgment interest, and therefore there is no standard of 
review. 
V. The Legislation Precludes any Recovery in 
Excess of $125,000 by Statute as a Recovery 
From the State on the Judgment Granted 
Plaintiff Carroll C. Nichols May 31, 1990. 
The standard of review is that the Plaintiffs must 
show that the trial court was incorrect in its determination 
of legislative intent. Carter v. Utah Power & Light, 146 Utah 
Admin. R. 6 (Utah 1990). 
VI. Plaintiff's Judgments Should be Reversed as 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-2.3 (1986) is 
Unconstitutional Special Legislation Prohibited 
by Article VI, Section 26, Utah Constitution, 
The standard of review is that the State must show 
that the trial court was incorrect in not finding the 
legislation unconstitutional as special legislation. Carter 
v. Utah Power & Light, 146 Utah Admin. R. 6 (Utah 1990). 
3 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGUIATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-2.3 (1986): 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Common motor carrier of passengers" means a 
person, partnership, or corporation which has been 
granted a certificate of convenience and necessity 
by the Public Service Commission under Chapter 6, 
Title 54. 
(b) "Vanpool" means a mode of transportation where: 
(i) more than six but not more than 15 persons, 
including the driver, ride together in a motor 
vehicle; 
(ii) the transportation is incidental to 
another purpose of the driver; and 
(iii) the vehicle manufacturer's design 
capacity of any seat is not exceeded. 
(c) "Unfair competition" means conduct which 
injures the legitimate business of a common carrier 
of passengers by charging prices lower than the 
tariffs approved for certificated carriers, except 
that this conduct is not unfair competition if the 
tariff rates are shown to be in excess of fair 
charges for the services in question. 
(2) A common motor carrier of passengers which 
suffers losses by reason of unfair competition from 
vanpools as a result of the enactment of and 
operations under Chapter 11, Title 54, regarding 
ridesharing, may upon successful adjudication 
recover from the state the amount of those losses 
but not any expected profits; but such recovery 
shall not exceed $125,000 per claim. 
(3) Any person, partnership, or corporation, who 
extended credit to any common motor carrier and who 
suffered losses by reason of the unfair competition 
as referred to in Subsection (2) may upon successful 
4 
adjudication recover from the state the amount of 
those losses not exceeding $125,000 per claim so 
long as payment or judgment for the losses has not 
been made or obtained prior to suit on those claims. 
(4) This section applies to claims arising prior to 
March 29, 1984 if those claims are filed in the 
manner required in the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act and within four years after the cause of action 
arises. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Proceeding 
This is a statutory cause of action under the Unfair 
Competition in Ridesharing Act, Utah Code Ann. §13-5-2.3 
(1986). The Defendant/Third Party Plaintiffs Carroll C. 
Nichols and Shirley Nichols (hereinafter "Plaintiffs" seek 
recovery as persons into extended credit to a common motor 
carrier (C 8c G Transportation Corp., not a party to this 
appeal) for their "losses" by reason of unfair competition 
from van pools. 
Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiffs brought this third party action against 
the State after being sued by First Interstate Bank of Utah in 
1985. Trial was held on Plaintiffs' claims on March 22nd and 
23rd, 1988, and judgment was entered in favor of both 
Plaintiffs on a single claim for $125,000.00 on June 20, 1988. 
Plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
5 
which remanded once for further Findings of Fact on the issue 
of "joint" versus "separate" claims. After amended findings 
were entered, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment on 
the grounds that the record did not support the finding of a 
single "joint" claim, and remanded for further proceeding 
consistent with their opinion. See Addendum at • 
After remand, the trial court entered extensive 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Plaintiff's 
Claims, See Addendum at - On May 31, 1990, judgments 
were entered in favor of each Plaintiff against the State of 
Utah for sums certain (Carroll Nichols, $125,000-00; Shirley 
Nichols, $41,485-57), together with costs and interest "as 
provided by law". On June 29, 1990, both Plaintiffs appealed 
their judgments. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1- The State of Utah, Appellee, accepts as a 
partial Statement of Facts the paragraphs of Appellants' 
Statement of Facts numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 
16, 17, 18, and 19. The State of Utah sets forth, as the 
facts involved herein, the findings of the trial Court, set 
forth in the Addendum at 2. 
6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
•I.- . Plaintiff Shirley Nichols Was Not En I i t I * "d , .1:, 
a Matter of Law, to a Claim of Loss 
Representing One-Half Interest in Checks Paid 
From the Joint Family Bank Account in the 
Alleged Amount of $39,692.46. 
The trial court found that Plaintiff Shirley Nichols 
did not suffer as a loss an amount represent aui ;,•-->..•; >f 
the joint family bank account. That finding is based upon 
substantial (tv i done*•,, in t.he record, after a scrupulous review 
of the evidence by the trial court. Plaintiff fails to 
demonstrate that the finding was clearly erroneous, 
T T
 Plaintiff Shirley Nich • •t iiiiLxLled to 
Prejudgment Interest. 
A, The Unfair Competition in Ridesharing Act 
does not allow for prejudgment interest, 
The Utah legislature intended fh*" unfair competition 
in Ridesharing Act to provide a limited recovery of the 
damages of ti le PJ aintiffs. Recovery was limited by type of 
claim and total amount, Prejudgment interest , which is in the 
nature of claim for loss of business opportunity or 
prospect!''- > ad/v antage, is not allowed under the act.. 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment 
interest even if allowable under the 
unfair competition in ride sharing act. 
If allowed undci t ho act
 f prejudgment, interest is 
appropriate only if Plaintiffs' claims I M : I X ^ 
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measurable by facts and figures with mathematical certainty. 
Plaintiffs' claims, in this case, were subject to 
discretionary analysis and were, in essence, unliquidated plan 
to judgment. Therefore, the trial court properly determined 
that pre-judgment interest was inappropriate. 
III. The Claim by Plaintiff Shirley Nichols For 
$58,077.64, as Set Forth in Point III of 
Plaintiff's Brief (p. 31) is a Non-Meritless 
Claim to be Ignored by This Court as Having 
Been First Raised on Appeal, and Further 
Misrepresented as an Alleged Binding Admission 
and Commitment by the State. 
Plaintiffs have attempted to take a statement made 
by the State's counsel during final argument as a conclusive 
statement of the amount of damages. The trial court's factual 
finding - which differed from counsel's statement - was not 
clearly erroneous. Further, the statement did not bind the 
State. 
Finally, this claim was not raised by the Plaintiffs 
below, and they are barred from raising it for the first time 
on appeal. 
IV. Plaintiffs are not Entitled to Judgment 
Interest From June 20, 1988. 
Plaintiffs obtained an initial judgment against the 
State on June 20, 1988, which judgment was reversed by the 
Court of Appeals on February 21, 1990. The reversal of the 
8 
judgment rendered it d n« • further force of effect, and 
Plaintiffs are on . In nidqiiWMi 1 i mini os t :* at all, 
from the date of their current judgment - May 31, - -K 
V The Legislation Precludes any Recovery in 
Excess of $125,000 by Statute as a Recovery 
From the State on the Judgment Granted 
Plaintiff Carroll r Nichols May ^ 1Qt^. 
The State Legislature passed the statute to benefit 
the Plaintiffs, whose claim was known t > •• uwh,i. n: :; * 
$165,000- The legislature decided to limit claims to o-.-y 
certain Ly; •-• •* J i-: o limit total recovery to 
$125,000, rather than allow complete compensati mi !< the 
Plaintiffs for all damages. 
VI. Plaintiff's Judgments Should be Reversed as 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-2.3 (1986) is 
Unconstitutional Special Legislation Prohibited 
by Article VI, Section 26 , Utah Constitution. 
In p a s s i i tg t l le Ui if a i r Competi - • •• • u R i d e s h a r i n g Act 
(§13-5-2.3) the legislature knew and believed that the act 
only applied to the Plaintiffs, notwithstanding its general 
language. As siicl: i , i 1 : const::! tuted spec! a] ] egi s "I. J t * o:, 
prohibited by the IJtah Constitution. Therefore, Piaj.ir ii»: 
judgments cannot be sustained. 
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ARGUMENT 
!•-. " SHIRLEY NICHOLS WAS NOT ENTITLED, AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, TO ANY AMOUNT REPRESENTING ONE-HALF 
INTEREST IN CHECKS PAID FROM THE JOINT FAMILY 
BANK ACCOUNT IN THE ALLEGED AMOUNT OF 
$39,692.46. 
The Appellant, Shirley Nichols, is clearly in error 
when she states that the trial record shows no evidence that 
these losses were not solely losses to Carroll Nichols. On 
the contrary, the trial record is replete with evidence that 
most of the proceeds that went into the family bank account 
(the monies from the second mortgage on their home and the 
family trust monies, $41,458.57 [T. Exhibit 40, 41] excepted), 
were from loans and obligations strictly made by Carroll C. 
Nichols. (T. Ex. 16, T. Ex. 17, p. 411) also, (company loan 
payable to Carroll Nichols $61,038.50)(T. Exhibits 31, 33, 35, 
36, 39, 43, 44, 45, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, and 65) 
To claim after the fact and not at trial thar she in 
her own right as a creditor is entitled to some $40,000.00 
from the joint bank account, because several thousand dollars 
proceeded through the account, for the benefit of a defunct 
corporate common motor carrier, which family account was 
principally the embodiment of private and borrowed funds by 
Carroll C. Nichols, does not give to Shirley Nichols an 
outright benefit of half of the proceeds of said account used 
10 
t i» |i.,iy the debts and obligations of the corporate enti.t\ , <"*. 
G Transportation. 
Further, Shirley Nichols could not be held liable on 
l.ho .iccoiin! s at the Bank of Utah, Box Elder Credit Unioi1, Box 
Elder County Bank, First Interstdt.e Hr.nil*( iind Fir si Security 
Bank, (Exhibit 16) unless, in fact, she held contracted, by her 
si griatiire thereon, to obligate herself personally for said 
monies borrowed, extended, or credit granted, 
therefore, supported by the evidence at trial and ss Inv that 
she can noi be held liable to those from whom her husband 
borrowed the funds, used for the benefit •>* ihe failed I us 
company. Therefore, she cannot claim the benefit of said 
fiinds as alleged damages herein. 
After careful consideration the trial court made 
Findings of Fact number 50, (R57 6-57 7) 
Carroll C. Nichols, though husband of Shirley 
Nichols, gave a large personal extension of 
credit to the corporation prior to the Utah 
Ridership Act, while Carroll C. Nichols was 
President of the C & G Transportation 
Corporation, for equipment in the form of 
busses and vans. Shirley Nichols is neither 
responsible for that debt, nor can she claim 
any benefit therefrom as a claim for loss as a 
creditor of the corporation by reason of being 
Carroll's wife or the fact that most of the 
proceeds from extension of credit by her 
husband were processed though their joint 
checking account. It may well be different if 
this were a community property state. 
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The Court sustained the argument of the State of 
Utah that by virtue of being a wife on a joint bank account in 
this case, with its own set of facts, did not entitle Shirley 
Nichols to half of the benefits or the proceeds that flowed 
through the family account, it being with her knowledge and 
concurrence, a mixed business and family account. The court 
also affirmed that Shirley Nichols would not have been liable 
as a matter of law on the base obligations of Carroll Nichols 
for repayment of the proceeds of the many loans. 
Therefore, to state that Shirley Nichols was 
entitled to one-half of the proceeds that had flowed through 
the bank account is totally in error as a matter of law and 
the judgment in her behalf May 31, 1990, should be sustained 
as entered. 
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the trial 
court's findings and analysis were clearly erroneous. 
Therefore, Plaintiff Shirley Nichols' judgment should not be 
increased as urged by Plaintiffs. 
II. SHIRLEY NICHOLS IS NOT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
ENTITLED TO $39,201.84 TO PRE-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST. 
A. The Unfair Competition in Ridesharing Act 
Does Not Allow for Pre-judgment Interest. 
12 
The statutory cause of action allows at most for the 
recovery of a person's "losses" by reason of unfair 
competition. It is the States position here that this does 
not include nor allows prejudgment interest, 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-2.3 (3), the section under 
which Plaintiffs have made their claims, is not designed or 
intended to make the Plaintiffs "whole". Claims are limited 
to "losses", not to "damages". This appears to exclude such 
claims as future profits, lost opportunities, attorney's fees 
and similar normal "damages" claims. In addition, of course, 
there is an outside limit of any recovery of $125,000.00, 
again showing the limited nature of what a claimant can 
recover. 
The trial court also determined that the legislative 
intent behind the act precluded prejudgment interest. The 
court noted that the act is silent as to prejudgment interest, 
implying that it is not allowed. Further, the Legislature 
knew in limiting the recovery that the Plaintiffs would no 
recover their full losses in any event - the Legislature was 
allowing only a $125,000 recovery on Plaintiffs' $165,000.00 
claim. (See Conclusion of Law No. 5[a], Addendum at 2). 
It is clear that the Plaintiffs' recovery, if any, 
was intended to be limited, as to amount ($125,000) as well as 
13 
the type of claim (losses). Prejudgment interest is in 
essence a measure of loss of a prospective advantage, or 
opportunity costs, and is clearly the type of "damage" that 
the Legislature intended to exclude where it limited the 
recovery possible under the statue to "losses" not exceeding 
$125,000,000 
B. Plaintiffs are not Entitled to Prejudgment 
Interest Even if Authorized Under the 
Unfair Competition in Ridesharing Act. 
The trial court gave serious consideration to the 
issue of prejudgment interest as claimed by the Appellants who 
laid claim to original claims going back to the date of the 
payment of the claim. The trial court rejected any such 
claims occurring prior to the enactment of the Ridership Act. 
Finding of Fact # 17, Conclusion of Law #2, Addendum 2. The 
trial court also dismissed the claimed prejudgment interest of 
the Nichols'. Conclusion of Law #5, pp. 15-17, Addendum 2. 
Shirley Nichols had no obligation on those corporate 
bills, she was not obligated on any of the loans from which 
the proceeds originated, and she, therefore, cannot claim that 
amount as "losses". These loans were the sole obligation of 
Carroll C. Nichols. Shirley Nichols' loss could only be 
weighed and determined by the trial court from property or 
money she personally had or lost based on a creditor-debtor 
14 
relationship with C & G Transportation- That clearly was 
limited to one-half of the proceeds of the second mortgage on 
the house and 25^% of the proceeds of the family trust. There 
is no error by the trial court on the allegations as to 
prejudgment interest. See Finding of Fact No. 50, Addendum 2. 
Of all the claimed losses, the amount of $165,384.92 
was allowed at trial. Amended Finding of Fact 41, Addendum 2 
The findings, as amended, took into account all of the checks 
that were produced at trial. T. Exhibit 23-30 Various 
adjustments were made, Exhibit S adjusted of the Nichols' post 
trial brief, dated April 25, 1988, and Amended Findings of 
Fact 1-41. (R 565-578) The Amended Findings of Fact dealt 
with the disallowances set forth by exhibit number in summary 
form, and did not allow any loss for which there was not proof 
at trial as set forth in the trial transcript and the exhibits 
produced at that time. (emphasis ours) Addendum 2<f T. Exhibit 
23-30. 
This court has recently discussed when a party may 
be entitled to pre-judgment interest in Canyon County Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). This court stated, at p. 
422: 
This Court has repeatedly stated the law 
in Utah as it applies to prejudgment 
interest: 
15 
[W]here the damage is complete and the 
amount of the loss is fixed as of a 
particular time, and that loss can be 
measured by facts and figures, interest 
should be allowed from that time -,. and 
not from the date of judgment. On the 
other hand, where damages are incomplete 
or cannot be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy, such as in the case of personal 
injury, wrongful death, defamation of 
character, false imprisonment, etc-, the 
amount of the damages must be ascertained 
and assessed by the trier of the fact at 
the trial, and in such cases prejudgment 
interest is not allowed. 
The analysis in determining the 
appropriateness of a prejudgment interest 
award is whether a claim such as lost 
profits is ascertainable with mathematical 
accuracy. It is, of course, axiomatic 
that all claims can be reduced eventually 
to monetary value. All claims would 
therefore at some point become liquidated 
and theoretically subject to prejudgment 
interest claims. Common sense precludes 
such an interpretation, however. 
In this case, we view the grocery store's 
loss-of-profits damage as analogous to 
damages awarded in wrongful death or 
defamation cases and therefore 
unliquidated. While the basis of the 
"formula" used to determine Canyon 
Country's lost profits may have been 
sufficient for the jury to render a 
verdict in favor of Canyon Country, it is 
too speculative to allow for the addition 
of prejudgment interest. The store was 
not an established business with a long-
term history of profits. It was open for 
eipproximately fourteen months and never 
made a net profit. Due to pending 
foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings, it 
is uncertain whether the store could have 
stayed in business even had the insurance 
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claim been promptly paid. The purpose of 
a prejudgment interest award is to 
compensate a plaintiff for actual loss or 
to prevent a defendant's unjust 
enrichment. There was no unjust gain by 
the insurers in this case, and with the 
amount of uncertainty involved in 
determining an actual loss, it would have 
been inappropriate for the trial court to 
allow for the addition of prejudgment 
interest. 
The test is also whether or not discretionary 
factual analysis is needed to determine the exact amount of 
the claim. If so, the amount is not determinable 
mathematically and without dispute and prejudgment interest is 
improper. As stated by the Washington Supreme Court in Segall 
v. Ben's Truck Parts, Inc., 488 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1971): 
Where trial court in an action to recover 
value of service performed in design and 
production of computer programs had to 
exercise discretion as to what evidence to 
give credit to and what amounts to use in 
computations without reference to a 
contractual standard of the parties, 
denial of interest on amount due from time 
obligation matured until judgment was 
entered was proper. 
In this case the trial court was forced to expend 
considerable effort and discretion in unwinding the separate 
claims of the parties, and their claim of separate losses. 
The claimed amounts of the Plaintiffs were thus, in 
contemplation of the rule on prejudgment interest, 
unliquidated, speculative, and not subject to exact 
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formulation until the conclusion of the trial. Therefore, the 
trial court correctly found that prejudgment interest should 
not be allowed in the case. This finding and conclusion has 
not been demonstrated to be wrong. 
III. THE CLAIM BY PLAINTIFF SHIRLEY NICHOLS, AS SET 
FORTH IN POINT III OF PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF (Page 
31) IS A NON-MERITORIOUS CLAIM TO BE IGNORED BY 
THIS COURT AS HAVING BEEN FIRST RAISED ON 
APPEAL, AND FURTHER MIS-PRESENTED AS AN ALLEGED 
BINDING ADMISSION AND COMMITMENT BY THE STATE. 
Appellee State of Utah argues that a supposition 
used by counsel in final argument at trial that a certain 
imprecise amount of damages may be allowed as damages (i.e. 
$58,07 7.64) if the court allows any separate amount to Shirley 
Nichols, cannot be construed as an admission of judgment 
against the state. Further, the attorney for the State of 
Utah cannot bind the State to any debt or fixed obligation. 
As stated by the Montana Supreme Court in Brown by Brown v. 
Markve, 700 P.2d 602 (Mont. 1985), at page 603: 
In reviewing the Memo Opinion and Order of 
the District Court, we find that the 
district judge referred to the fact that 
in closing argument, defense counsel 
suggested to the jury that "a fair verdict 
would be $30,000.00." The court then 
concluded that this argument to the jury 
had the legal effect of an admission 
cigainst interest which set the lower 
limits of the verdict at $30,000.00. No 
citation of legal authority is cited for 
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that conclusion. In addition, the 
conclusion of the trial court contradicts 
its own Instruction No. 1 which in part 
stated as follows: "Statements of counsel 
are not to ge regarded by you as evidence 
and you will disregard any such statements 
which are not supported by the evidence 
received upon this trial." 
By this argument, the defense counsel 
obviously sought to encourage the jury to 
reach a lower verdict because of the 
presence of an admission of liability on 
the part of his client. However, that 
suggestion cannot be classed as evidence 
or an admission against interest which set 
a floor of $30,000.00 below which the jury 
could not go. The jury remained the 
finder of fact with the right to set the 
damages at $25,000.00 or such other figure 
as the jurors might conclude to be 
appropriate under the evidence. 
Utah is the same. There is no unilateral binding of 
the State by its attorney, who in the context of argument, 
makes such a statement. (See Nichols' Brief p. paragraph 
). In Gorgoza v. Utah State Road Comm'n, 553 P.2d 413 
(Utah 19 76) the Court stated, at page 415: 
The principle of law is sound that neither 
defendant, nor his counsel can, by 
stipulation, change the law or bind the 
State contrary to law, or waive its rights 
there under. 
In the present case, there was no written 
stipulation but a mere conjecture, in final argument, based on 
partial evidence at trial put forth by Shirley Nichols as a 
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"split the pie" argument for a larger share of the loss her 
husband had suffered. 
The trial court found no evidence for this claim of 
$58,077,64 at trial or following remand from the Court of 
Appeals. Plaintiffs have not shown that factual determination 
to be clearly erroneous. Further, this is a non-meritorious, 
near frivolous claim by Shirley Nichols that was not raised in 
the court below and should be rejected out of hand. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
INTEREST FROM JUNE 20, 1988. 
Plaintiffs' claim judgment interest from their first 
judgment, entered June 20, 1988, on the apparent theory that 
their current judgment, which they have appealed, is "better" 
than their first judgment and, therefore, must "include" that 
first judgment, which continues to bear judgment interest. 
That claim and theory ignores the fact that that judgment was 
reversed by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated 
February 21, 1990. See Addendum at 1. 
An appeal only lies from a final judgment on appeal. 
R. 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. On appeal, the 
appellate court can only affirm, reverse, or modify, or 
otherwise dispose of a judgment. R. 30, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Plaintiffs mis-apprehend the nature of 
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the civil process to claim that only the "reasoning" of the 
trial court was reverse, but not the judgment, by the Court of 
Appeals, 
This court specifically was held that a "reversal* 
constitutes a "vacating" and a "setting aside" of a judgment, 
rendering the judgment of no force or effect. Further, on 
remand, the trial court should put the parties into the 
position as if no erroneous judgment had been entered. Eckard 
v. Smith, 545 P.2d 501 (Utah 1976) 
The original judgment of June 20, 1988, was for a 
"joint loss" of the Plaintiffs', See Conclusion of Law #2, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law entered June 20f 1988, 
Rec. at 324, The Court of Appeals ruled that conclusion of a 
single joint claim was "erroneous", and not sustained by the 
evidence. The Court of Appeals remanded for a determination 
of the "separate claims" of the Plaintiffs. See Opinion of 
Court of Appeals, page 2, Addendum at 1. The claims of the 
individual Plaintiffs were never determined until the present 
judgments were entered. The right, if any, to judgment 
interest on the individual claims of the Plaintiffs stems from 
the determination and entry of a judgment on the separate 
claims - May 31, 1990 - not from a judgment on a claim that 
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the Court of Appeal ruled never existed - the single court 
claim of the Plaintiffs. 
Therefore, if the Plaintiffs are entitled to 
judgment interest, it can only run from the date of their 
current and only outstanding judgment - May 31, 1990• 
V, THE LEGISLATION PRECLUDES ANY RECOVERY IN 
EXCESS OF $125,000.00 BY STATUE AS A RECOVERY 
FROM THE STATE ON THE JUDGEMENT GRANTED 
PLAINTIFF CARROLL C. NICHOLS MAY 31, 1990. 
The trial record shows what was behind the Unfair 
Competition in Rideshare Statute, The Act was passed in 1935 
to assist Carroll C. Nichols to obtain redress if he were 
within by its provisions. As noted previously (see Point II)f 
the legislation limits the types of claims as well as the 
total amount of recovery, 
The Legislature in 19 85 amended the Unfair 
Competition Act to help rectify a problem created earlier 
through passage of the Van Pool Act, The size of the problem 
was approximately $165,000 on the last day of the session the 
Senate. The final version of H.B. 210 included the Senate 
imposed cap of $125,000.00. 
The legislative intent to limit the Plaintiffs' 
claims to $125,000 is very clear. The legislature clearly 
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intended to address the claims of Carroll and Shirley Nichols. 
In the Senate report it states (T. Exhibit 22): 
Senator Hillyard: . . . but there is only 
one person that I know will qualify for 
that, but you can't draft it for just one 
person. If in fact there is recovery, 
it's for the out of pocket money that he 
would lose, not for profits, which is the 
other thing he normally could recover, 
because of governmental immunity and the 
Legislature taking an action in it, 
without really realizing that they were 
driving a private businessman totally out 
of business. 
Senator Cornaby: Well, if it only affects 
potentially one person, do we have an 
estimate of how much that liability is? 
Senator Hillyard: My understanding is the 
maximum amount is $165,000 in the amount 
of money that he has advanced. My belief, 
too, is if there is found a violation, it 
will probably be covered by insurance. 
. . (T. Exhibit 22, p. 4, lines 24, 25, 
26; p. 5, line 1) 
Senator Soward: . . . and as I understand 
we're only dealing with one person, but 
you can't write a bill for one person—he 
is entitled to restitution. And I support 
it. (T. Exhibit 22, page 5, lines 18-21) 
Senator Renstrom: . . . But I think the 
strength of this bill is that in writing 
it has to appear that it would cover 
several, because to suggest that it's only 
going to cover one would constitute a bill 
of retainer, that [sic] would be 
unconstitutional. So it has to be written 
so that this gentleman or people in my 
situation could sue. (T. Exhibit 22 p. 
18, lines 16-21) 
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Senator Black: . . . The company says it 
suffered in attempting to provide 
transportation to and from Thiokol 
Chemical Company of Box Elder County, C & 
D [sic] Transportation Company presented 
the Board with a claim for $164,963 in 
damages as the amount the company says it 
lost because van pools took away the 
company's riders. . * . * (T. Exhibit 22 P. 
19, lines 12-17) 
The Senate and House discussion of the what was to become Utah 
Code Ann. § 13-5-2.3 (1953) clearly shows that they were 
trying to address the problem faced by the Nichols. 
Clerk: Mr. Speaker . . • the Senate has 
this day passed, under suspension of the 
Rules, and as amended by the House and 
Senate, House Bill 210, Unfair Competition 
in Ride-Sharing, by Representative Rob W, 
Bishop. The bill is returned herewith for 
further House action. 
Speaker: Representative Bishop?. . . 
David, would you like to briefly explain those? 
Mr. (?): Yes 
They merely, in the Senate, put a cap on 
the amount that anyone could gain from any 
one given lav/suit. 
Speaker: Okay 
Representatives, the motion is that we 
concur in the Senate Amendments to House 
Bill 210. (vote) . . . 
Speaker: The motion carries. 
(T. Exhibit 21 page 18, lines 2 through 21) 
1
 (Emphasis added) Utah State Senate transcription from Gray 
Audiograph tape recording of the Senate proceedings on House Bill 
No. 210, Feb. 27, 1985. 
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Carroll Nichols and his attorney were mentioned in 
the bill several times and were responsible for getting the 
bill introduced. As far as the Legislature knew, the 
Plaintiffs had lost approximately $165,000,00, the amount 
declared twice in unsuccessful claims before the Board of 
Examiners, and the Legislature felt that $125,000.00 would 
help solve the problem for him and any others similarly 
situated. 
It is clear that the Legislature sought to allow a 
"limited" recovery to the Plaintiffs if they could prove their 
claim. The legislature knew it was going to allow less than 
the losses of the Plaintiffs, and chose to limit the total 
amount of recovery to $125f000.00. This limit applies to all 
types of claims allowable, of whatever type. This would 
include interest claims - be that prejudgment interest if 
allowed and post-judgment interest. It makes no sense to say 
that the legislature meant to limit the principal amount of 
loss to $125,000, no matter now large the claim may be, but 
then to allow interest on that $125,000 to increase the award. 
The legislature set the limit of state liability, of whatever 
basis, under the statute to $125,000. Therefore, this court 
should disallow post-judgment interest to the extent that 
state liability would then exceed $125,000,00, 
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VI• PLAINTIFFS' JUDGMENT SHOULD BE TOTALLY REVERSED 
AS UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-2.3 (1986) IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SPECIAL LEGISLATION PROHIBITED 
BY ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26, UTAH STATE 
CONSTITUTION. 
This legislation was passed in the 1985 session of 
the Utah State Legislature to solve an announced problem of 
Carroll C. Nichols, (T. Ex.'s 21 and 22, also, Point V 
herein) House and Senate deliberations on H.B. 210 (the Act) 
show the specific intent was to provide a waiver to the 
defense of immunity of the State of Utah, and provide a 
specific way for Mr. and Mrs, Nichols to sue for recovery of 
their alleged losses from a failed business- (See citation to 
detected herein in Point V, and T. Exhibit 21 and 22). There 
was, and is, no one other than Plaintiffs, who could benefit 
from this legislation. This the Legislature cannot do. 
Lauers v. City of Phoenix, 83 P.2d 283 (Ariz. 1938), 
quoting Southerlands St. Const. § 129, at p. 289, states, "If 
a statute is plainly intended for a particular case and looks 
to no broader application in the future, it is special or 
local, and if such laws are prohibited, it is 
unconstitutional." Article VI, Section 26, Utah Constitution 
prohibits Special Legislation. 
The general law on this issue in Utah is set forth 
in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance v. Utah Insurance Guaranteed 
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Ass'n., citation quoting State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 
P.2d 414 (1939), as follows: 
State v. Kallas sets forth the Supreme 
Court's general definition of general and 
special laws: 
A general law applies to and operates 
uniformly upon all members of any class of 
persons, places, or things requiring legal 
action peculiar to themselves in matters 
covered by the laws in question. On the 
other hand, special legislation relates 
either to particular persons, places or 
things which, though not particularized, 
are separated by an method of selection 
from which the whole class to which the 
law might, but for such legislation, be 
applied. 
Utah Farm Bureau goes on quoting People Western Fruit Growers,. 
22 Cal.2d 494, 140 P-2d 13 (1943) pp. 19-20, stating: 
It is special legislation if it compels 
particular privileges or imposes special 
disabilities, or burdensome conditions in 
the exercise of a common right; upon a 
class of persons arbitrarily selected from 
the general body of those who stand in 
precisely the same relation to the subject 
of the law. 
The legislation in question, Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-
2.3 (1986) as amended, denoted "Uniform Competition in 
Ridersharing" is such a piece of special legislation. It 
appears to be set out in language that is broad and generally 
applying to any "common carrier" in the stated class. 
However, as the record conclusively demonstrates, there were 
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only the Plaintiff who could or would benefit from the 
legislation. 
This statute is clearly designed to benefit only 
these Plaintiffs, although the legislature wanted to avoid the 
appearance of this reality* See comments of Senator Renstrom 
cited in Point V, supra. As such, it is special legislation 
prohibited by the Utah Constitution, and of no force or 
effect. Therefore, this Court should reverse the judgments 
generated by the Court below and disallow any recovery by the 
Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the legislation 
that forms the basis for this action was unconstitutional 
special legislation, and this Court should, therefore, reverse 
and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the State of 
Utah. Failing that, this Court should deny the claims for 
interest of the Plaintiffs, refuse to increase the amount of 
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the judgments as requested by Plaintiffs, and affirm the 
judgments as entered- [^  
DATED this day of November, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Ct)torney General 
CNARD M. TANNER'' 
Assistant Attorney General 
THOM D. ROBERTS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 3c^) day of 
November, 1990, four copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent were mailed, first class postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Robert B, Hansen 
838 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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ADDENDUM 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00-
First Interstate Bank of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Carroll C. Nichols and 
Shirley Nichols, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
C. & G. Transportation 
Corporation, 
First Third-Party 
Defendant, 
v. 
State of Utah, 
Second Third-Party 
Defendant. 
p r\ 
V Cj-^ Of *~,* Court 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Publication) 
Case No. 890308-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Garff, and Davidson, 
PER CURIAM: 
This appeal is again before the Court following remand for 
the entry of additional findings of fact. Appellants claim the 
findings of fact, even as supplemented on remand, are 
insufficient to support the conclusion of law that appellants 
are entitled to a single joint claim under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 13-5-2.3. We agree and reverse and remand for further 
proceedings. 
This case was originally heard by the court pursuant to R. 
Utah Ct. App. 31. Because the findings of fact did not explain 
why Mr. and Mrs. Nichols, who in fact and in law are two 
separate persons, were only entitled to a single joint claim, 
we remanded the case for entry of such additional findings of 
\J o ^  ^«_»' JL 
fact as the trial court desired to make in support of its 
conclusion. 
After the case was remanded, the court entered additional 
findings of fact, in exactly the same form as were tendered by 
the state, which do not clarify in any meaningful way why Mr. 
and Mrs. Nichols are limited to a single joint claim. The new 
findings do not state that the legislature intended to limit 
Mr. and Mrs. Nichols to one $125,000 claim, nor is the finding 
that the legislature intended to cap the recovery in any one 
lawsuit at $125,000 supported by the evidence. 
This court considers that the separate legal identity of 
Mr. and Mrs. Nichols creates a prima facie showing that they 
are each entitled to pursue whatever claims they individually 
may have under section 13-5-2.3. The burden to show otherwise 
shifts to the state. We conclude the state has not sustained 
its burden of proving that Mr. and Mrs. Nichols are entitled to 
a single joint claim. 
Because the erroneous legal conclusion that the Nicholses 
were entitled to a single joint claim precluded appropriate 
consideration and scrutiny of the proper amount of their 
respective claims, we remand to the trial court for a 
determination of the amount of Mr. and Mrs. Nicholses' separate 
claims and for entry of judgment in accordance therewith. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of March, 1990, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Remittitur was mailed to each of the 
following: 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Appellants 
838 - 18th Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
R. Paul Van Dam 
State Attorney General 
Bernard M. Tanner 
Assistant Attorney General 
Room 130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake County 
Case No. C85-2465 
Julia C. Whitfield 
Deputy Clerk
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OoOoo 
First Interstate Bank of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Carroll C. Nichols and 
Shirley Nichols, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
C. & G. Transportation 
Corporation, 
First Third-Party 
Defendant, 
v. 
State of Utah, 
Second Third-Party 
Defendant-
March 14, 1990 
REMITTITUR 
Case No, 890308-CA 
&rs'£V6s~ 
This cause having been submitted, and the Court being 
sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now ordered, 
adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the district court 
be, and the same is reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings<. 
Issued: February 21, 1990 
Record: 6 volumes 1 envelope 1 box exhibits 
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CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Mary T. Noonan, Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and correct copy of the 
Memorandum Decision 
in the action entitled 
First Interstate v. Nichols 
now on file in my office. 
In Testimony Whereof, I have set 
ray hand and affixed the seal of 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
By Julia Whitfield 
Deputy Clerk 
Dated: March 14, 1990 
ADDENDUM 2 
Thhd Jv?'j*C;ci! District 
R, PAUL VAN DAM #3312 
Attorney General 
BERNARD M. TANNER #3185 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Division 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1019 
MAY 3 1 1990 
(/ oJA.yC'&k 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CARROLL C- NICHOLS and SHIRLEY 
NICHOLS, 
Defendants and Third 
Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
C & G TRANSPORTATION 
CORPORATION, 
First Third Party 
Defendant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Second Third Party 
Defendant* 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENTS AND 
MOTION FOR TRIAL COURT'S 
ADOPTION THEREOF 
Civil No. C-85-2465 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
COMES NOW Bernard M. Tanner, Assistant Attorney General, 
counsel for the State of Utah, Second Third Party Defendant 
proposes the amended Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and 
the Proposed Final Judgments thereon, and moves the trial Court 
for adoption thereof pursuant to that certain remand, February 
21, 1990, to the Third District Court from the Utah Court of 
Appeals by Judges Orme, Davidson, and Garff. 
Hereafter TR will be Trial Record and TR Exhibit means 
an exhibit received in evidence March 22 and March 23, 1988, at 
trial. TP will mean Transcript of Proceedings, March 22nd and 
23rd, 1988. 
The Findings of Fact are as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1- The Claimants, Carroll and Shirley Nichols, 
complied with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by serving 
notice upon the State of Utah and the proper agencies thereof 
through their counsel on or about the 31st day of May, 1985, and 
June 6, 1985 respectively, TR Exhibits 1^9 and 20. 
2. C & G Transportation, Corporation was a 
corporation organized by Greg Lee and Carroll C. Nichols 
incorporated on the 25th day of June, 1980, for the purpose of 
operating as a common carrier, to transport passengers to and 
from Thiokol in Box Elder County Utah. 
— 2 — r\ p •. ^  * 
3. C & G Transportation Corp. bought A & C Bussing 
Company, a common carrier, certificate #1995, on July 2, 1980, 
and on that same day applied for expanded Public Service 
Commission authority. 
4. Tariffs for the aforesaid transportation services 
were duly filed on October 27, 1980 and August 9, 1981. 
5. On the 15th day of September, 1980, the aforesaid 
corporation duly received Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity No. 2009 authorizing it to transport passengers to and 
from Thiokol's facilities in Box Elder County from various 
locations in that county and also Davis, Weber, Box Elder and 
Cache Counties. 
6. On February 2, 1981 the C & G Transportation 
Corporation applied to the Public Service Commission for amended 
tariffs, which were granted March 31, 1981. 
7* Prior to enactment of the Ridership Act, C & G 
Transportation Corporation and Carroll C. Nichols individually, 
had obligated themselves for busses and vans in the operation of 
the business in the amount of $159,683.00 (See attachment A to 
Findings of Fact and TR Exhibit 3_3 of Trial Record) . 
8*. After enactment of the Ridership Act, effective 
May 12, 1981, the Corporation and Carroll C. Nichols obligated 
themselves for an additional bus on June 17, 1981, for $9,103.00. 
-3-
9. On May 13, 1981, Carroll C- Nichols and Shirley 
Nichols (TR Exhibit _41) borrowed $69,000-00 from First Security 
Bank of Utah in Brigham City, Utah on a second mortgage, of which 
$22,599.45 was paid to the Box Elder County Bank and $46,400-55 
was retained by the Nichols and used as either investment in C & 
G Transportation Corporation or to pay obligations of the 
Corporation, 
10- On January 3, 1984, Carroll C. Nichols and Shirley 
Nichols sold their home and from the proceeds, on a settlement 
statement dated January 3, 1984, effective January 1, 1984, paid 
$68,607-05 to First Security Bank to retire in full the second 
mortgage of May 13, 1981 and obtain a release thereof. (TR 
Exhibit 40) 
11. After the enactment of the Utah Ridesharing Act, 
codified at Utah Code Annotated §§ 54-11-1 through 54-11-10 (1953 
as amended), the Division of Public Utilities, Department of 
Business Regulation, received complaints from C & G 
Transportation, Corporation, Lewis Brothers Stages and others 
concerning van pools authorized by the aforesaid act, taking away 
their passengers. 
12. Neither the Division of Public Utilities nor C & G 
Transportation, Corporation had or obtained any legal remedy to 
prevent van pools from charging lesser fares than the applicable 
tariff rates for transportation by C & G Transportation, 
Corporation, a common carrier. 
-4-
13. The third party plaintiffs are victims of unfair 
competition within the meaning of the Unfair Practices Act, at 
Utah Code Annotated § 13-5-2.3 (1953 as amended). 
14. Third party plaintiffs were injured because they 
were creditors of C & G Transportation Corporation, a common 
carrier, certificated by the Public Service Commission under 
Certificate 2009 on September 15, 1980. 
15. Third party plaintiffs as creditors of C & G 
Transportation Corporation suffered losses by reason of unfair 
competition. 
16. Recovery for the third party plaintiffs is limited 
to $125,000 per claim due to House Bill 210, (1985) codified at 
Utah Code Annotated § 13-5-2.3 (1953 as amended) 
17. The losses claimed as a result of the extension of 
credit to the common carrier, C & G Transportation Corporation, 
as a result of the 1981 Van Pool Act but occurring prior to the 
enactment of the Legislation, (See TR Exhibit ^3) cannot be part 
of any claimed loss by the third party plaintiffs, and are hereby 
rejected (see addendum #A, to the findings). 
18. The claimed creditor debtor relationship with the 
corporation on the loan payoff of check #330, dated November 17, 
1981 (TR Exhibit !23J , to Murray Nichols for $7,000.00 was 
personal between Carroll Nichols and Murray Nichols and is 
rejected as part of the claimed loss on the part of Plaintiff 
Carroll C. Nichols as a creditor of C & G Transportation 
Corporation as there was no proof at trial of the corporate 
obligation on this $10,000.00 note. 
19. The claimed losses from a creditor debtor 
relationship with the corporation on the loan payoff on a 
promissory note between Carroll C. Nichols and Shirley Nichols 
and Blaine Wilcox as evidenced by checks #450, dated February 5, 
1982 on TR Exhibit 2!5 for $1,000.00 and check #59, dated May 5, 
1982, TR Exhibit _27_f for $1,000.00, are rejected as to both 
parties Plaintiffs' as said promissory note was personal to the 
Carrolls' and the evidence is insufficient to establish a 
creditor relationship with the C & G Transportation Corporation 
on said $10,000.00 note to be included as a loss due to the Utah 
Ridesharing Act. 
20. All post trial appellant exhibits not a part of 
Plaintiffs post trial brief filed April 25, 1988 but filed on 
appeal by Plaintiffs are rejected. 
21. The claims for pre-judgment interest on all 
alleged losses of Plaintiffs from May 12, 1981, through Judgment 
of The Third District Court on June 20, 1988, on behalf of 
Carroll C. Nichols are not allowed as a measure of loss or 
damages. (See paragraphs #15a and #15b, statutory interpretation 
and conclusions of law at pages 15 and 16 hereafter) 
22. The claimed interest by Shirley Nichols on her 
alleged losses by reason of: 
a- The First Security Bank loan proceeds on a second 
mortgage dated May 13, 1981, 
b. 26% of the amount used for the benefit of the 
corporation from the Carroll C. Nichols Family Partnership and 
c. the alleged claimed loss of interest on the $2,000-00 
repayed on the Blaine Wilcox promissory note are all rejected as 
a measure of damages or loss pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 
13-5-2-5(3) (1953 as amended)-
23. The claimed loss of Shirley Nichols as a creditor 
of C & G Transportation Corporation, as set forth on Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit S, to Post Trial brief (filed April 25, 1988) named 
"Amended Computation of Losses" (undated) at paragraph #1 for 
$46,046-51 as 1/2 of the principal loss from the joint bank 
account is rejected as to principal and interest-
24. The claimed loss of Shirley Nichols on the above 
Exhibit S, to Post Trial Brief (April 25, 1988) computation (a 
two page document), at paragraph 3, in the amount of $3,211-88 is 
granted as to the principal amount only-
25. The claimed loss of Shirley Nichols on the 
document referred to in paragraph 23 above, at paragraph 7, 
therein, in the amount of $34,303-52 is accepted as a loss to her 
as to the principal amount only. 
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26. Third party plaintiffs' $22,000 claimed advance to 
the common carrier from the family partnership is limited as to 
their claim to 52% of the total sum advanced as that is their 
combined interest as general partners in the Carroll C. Nichols 
Family Partnership (TR Exhibit 6j^, TP 192). 
27. Prior to the passage of the Ridership Act, March 
11, 1981, effective May 12, 1981, C & G Transportation 
Corporation had purchased 11 of its 12 vehicles for a cost of 
$159,683.00 (TR Exhibit _33) . Said purchases were made both by 
the corporation and Carroll Nichols individually and as 
guaranteed by Carroll Nichols. 
28. The $9,103.00 for the purchase of the Flexible 
Flyer Bus, on June 17, 1981 is accepted as a creditor loss by 
Carroll C. Nichols as it was subsequent to the effective date of 
the Utah Ridesharing Act of May 13, 1981. (TR Exhibit 33) 
29. Carroll Nichols was president and stockholder of C 
& G Transportation Corporation from its inception on June 25, 
1980, until he sold his interest in the corporation to his son-
in-law on February 15, 1982, for $5,000, reserving to himself 
obligations in the amount of $133,900 with the agreement the vans 
and busses would be sold and the proceeds therefrom going to the 
corporation. (TR Exhibit 16). 
30. Carroll C. Nichols is not allowed a claim for both 
$9,103.00 in paragraph 28 and a loss for the $133,900.00 on TR 
Exhibit 1^ 6, so this is recognized by the court as a claimed loss 
of only $124,797.00 to be adjusted by bank losses not included in 
the reserved debts from TR Exhibit Ij6 on equipment purchased, as 
evidenced by TR Exhibit 33. 
31. Third party plaintiffs' claim at the time of the 
passage of House Bill 210 (1985), now known as Utah Code 
Annotated §13-5-2.3, (1953 as amended), was $164,963 (TR Exhibit 
22, page 19, line 15). 
32. Van pools operating due to the Utah Ridesharing 
Act, Chapter 273, Laws of Utah 1981, passed March 11, 1981, 
effective May 12, 1981, and now known as Utah Code Annotated 
§§ 54-11-1, thru 54-11-10, (1953 as amended), were charging 
prices lower than the tariffs approved for C & G Transportation 
Corporation and also lower even after C & G Transportation 
Corporation had a 17% increase in their tariffs granted on July 
20, 1981, by the Public Service Commission. 
33. The claims alleged herein arose prior to March 29, 
1984. 
34. The claim of Carroll C. Nichols third party 
plaintiff herein, exceeded the statutory limit of $125,000. The 
claim of Shirley Nichols does not exceed the statutory limit of 
$125,000.00. 
35. The alleged loss on TR Exhibit 2^ of $38,271.67 is 
reduced by $7,000.00 - check #330, and also $8,300.00 as no 
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checks for those amounts were produced; also by all amounts 
listed before May 13, 1981 equaling $12,523.00 leaving a new 
subtotal of $10,000.73. 
36. As to TR Exhibit Z4, the alleged loss of 
$22,630.88, is reduced by the total amount of $3,399.03, 
representing four checks 381, 390, 416, and 434, which were not 
produced in evidence, for a subtotal of $19,231.85. 
37. As to TR Exhibit 2J3 the alleged loss of $8,771.00 
is reduced by $938.11 representing checks 443, 480, and 483, 
which were not produced at trial for a subtotal of $7,833.06. 
38. As to TR Exhibit 21_ t^ie alleged loss is reduced by 
Check #59 dated May 4, 1982, to Blaine Wilcox in the amount of 
$1,000.00 leaving a subtotal total loss of $9,554.60. 
39. As to TR Exhibit 2J^  the alleged loss is reduced by 
$633.78 as checks #2772, March 12, 1986, for $333.78 and check 
#184, March 21, 1987, for $300.00 were not produced at trial 
leaving a subtotal loss of $90,351.73. 
40. As to TR Exhibit 3J3 the alleged loss is reduced by 
$500.00, check #851 dated August 30, 1980 as that was before the 
passage of the Utah Ridesharing Act, May 12, 1981, leaving a 
subtotal of $926.51. 
41. The total of TR Exhibits 23 through 3j0 is 
$165,384.92 which includes the alleged loss on the home when 
sold. ($86,000.00, TR Exhibit 2!9, line 15, item dated January 3, 
1984) . 
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42. The amount of $1,426.51 (less $500.00) is included 
in the alleged claim of third party plaintiffs as set forth in TR 
Exhibit 30. 
43. Shirley Nichols assisted minimally in C & G 
Transportation Corporation doing some book work, but most of it 
being done by Teresa, her daughter (TR page 157, line 11). 
44. Shirley Nichols was not very knowledgeable about 
the books and records of the corporation (TR page 158, lines 18-
19). 
45. There is only one claim for loss, shared by 
Plaintiffs; (emphasis mine) as a result of mortgaging the home 
for $69,000 on a second mortgage in May 1981 and paying the 
amount of $68,607.05 to retire the second mortgage from the 
proceeds of the sale when the home was sold to pay an approximate 
$69,000 obligation to First Security Bank, each party Plaintiffs 
claims 1/2 that amount. (TR page 154, lines 2-7, and page 159, 
lines 13-25; also TR Exhibit 40^  dated January 3, 1984). 
46. C & G Transportation Corporation's bankruptcy 
filing (TR Exhibit 5>, page 4 of bankruptcy schedule A-3), shows 
an alleged debtor's obligation to Shirley Nichols of $86,055.28. 
47. On Exhibit 5, page 4, of the bankruptcy filing of 
C & G Transportation Corporation, Schedule A-3, the corporation 
shows an alleged debtor's obligation to Carroll C. Nichols of 
$128,500. 
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48/ On said settlement statement (TR Exhibit jyL) the 
purchasers of the home assumed the first mortgage of $10,786.57 
which may not be claimed as a loss by third party plaintiffs, on 
TR Exhibit 29 and also on TR Exhibit 41. 
49. C & G Transportation Corporation's books showed a 
negative amount on the companies capitol account of $39,826.00 in 
April, 1980, and a net loss of $30,583.36 on the Davis and Bott 
financial statement of February 28, 1981, before May 12, 1981, 
the effective date for enactment of the Ridesharing Act (TP 
246.)(TR Exhibit IT) Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, 
Carroll C. Nichols was on notice from the letter from the Box 
Elder County Bank (which was merged into First Interstate Bank) 
that the business was unprofitable as of March and April of 1981. 
The Small Business Administration had turned down Nichols' loan 
request as the SBA did not think the C & G Transportation 
Corporation "could show a profit" (see Exhibit A to Defendants 
Affidavit in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment dated 
December 31, 1986, filed with the Court in First Interstate's 
suit against Carrol C. Nichols, a copy of said letter and Motion 
received by the Attorney General's Office January 2, 1987). 
50. Carroll C. Nichols, though husband of wife Shirley 
Nichols, gave a large personal extension of credit to the 
corporation prior to the Utah Ridership Act, while Carroll C. 
Nichols was President of the C & G Transportation Corporation, 
-12- / > '~*\ 
for equipment in the form of busses and vans, Shirley Nichols is 
neither responsible for that debt nor can she claim any benefit 
therefrom as a claim for loss as a creditor of the corporation by 
reason of being Carrolls' wife or the fact that most of the 
proceeds from extension of credit by her husband were processed 
though their joint checking account- It may well be different if 
this were a community property state. 
51. Carroll C. Nichols7 claim (TR Exhibit 31)(also 
Exhibit S to Third Party Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief) for loss 
of principle and interest and attorney fees in the amount of 
$49,521.97 because of a judgment obtained against him, to be yet 
paid to First Interstate Bank, on money used for the benefit of C 
& G Transportation Corporation is disallowed, as the obligation 
upon which judgment was obtained was executed prior to May 12, 
1981, when the Utah Ridesharing Act was effective. (see 
promisory note dated July 23, 1980, Exhibit "B" to Defendant and 
Third Party Plaintiffs' affidavit dated December 31, 1986.) 
52. The $3,948.24 to First Security Bank (TP 257, 
258)(See page 2 of trial exhibit on damages, unnumbered, undated 
filed by Plaintiff as Exhibit S to Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief, 
items one and two on page 2 is allowed. 
53. The Division of Public Utilities had an 
enforcement policy against those who operated van pools before 
the Utah Ridership Act and a "no enforcement" policy against such 
additional van pools set up after that act was in force. 
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54. Before May 12, 1981 and afterwards, the 
percentages of passenger capacity for C & G Transportation 
Corporation utilization never exceeded 50%. C & G Transportation 
Corporation before and after the enactment of the Utah Ridership 
Act sustained substantial losses, and went out of business a few 
months after February 1982. 
55. C & G Transportation Inc. did not repay the 
aforesaid loans and as a result Carroll and Shirley Nichols 
jointly lost over $125,000.00f the statutory limit per clalmr and 
said losses were due to unfair competition from van pools 
operating under Chapter 11 of Title 54, U.C.A. 1953. 
From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACTS, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Third Party Plaintiffs were creditors of C & G 
Transportation, Inc., a common carrier of passengers, after May 
12, 1981. 
2. Third Party Plaintiff, Carroll C. Nichols suffered 
a loss of $134,711.78 subsequent to May 12, 1981, as a result of 
unfair competition due to the Utah Ridesharing Act of 1981, which 
loss is in excess of the $125,000.00 allowed as a potential 
recovery permitted by the enactment of House Bill 210 (Laws of 
Utah 1985) at Utah Code Annotated § 13-5-2.3(3) (1953 as 
amended). 
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3. Third Party Plaintiff, Shirley Nichols suffered a 
loss of $41,458-57, (Exhibit S, Third Party Plaintiffs' Post 
Trial Brief (April 25, 1988) as adjusted)(attached) less than the 
$125,000.00 allowed as a potental recovery permitted by the 
enactment of House Bill 210 (Laws of Utah 1985) Utah Code 
Annotated § 13-5-2.3(3) (1953 as amended). Said loss occured by 
reason of unfair competition from van pools as defined in Utah 
Code Annotated § 13-5-2.3(1)(c) (1953 as amended) as a result of 
their operations in competition to Plaintiffs under Chapter 11, 
Title 54 Utah Code Annotated. 
4. That pursuant to Exhibits _21^  and 22 of the trial 
record, the records of the House and Senate respectively, it is 
hereby found that the legislative intent was to "put a cap on the 
amount anyone could gain from any one given lawsuit" (TR Exhibit 
21, page 18, lines 16-25). 
5. As to Finding of Fact #21, (page 6), a mixed 
question of law and fact and statutory interpretation, it is 
further concluded on the issue of Prejudgment interest as 
follows: 
a. As to statutory construction and legislative 
intent on House Bill 210, Laws of Utah 1985, I find there must be 
a total denial to Defendant and Third Party Plaintiffs' of pre-
judgment interest. The court gives effect to the legislature's 
underlying intent, and holds that each term in the statute was 
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used advisedly. Section 13-5-2.3(2) and (3) was debated with the 
legislators' full understanding of the possible maximum claim 
which Nichols would seek to recover (approximately $164,000). In 
light of their understanding and knowledge, they set the maximum 
limit at $125,000 per claim. The statute is silent on the 
subject of prejudgment interest and such silence reveals the 
intent that the total amount of recovery cannot exceed $125,000. 
Lacking a statutory provision authorizing payment of prejudgment 
interest in addition to the $125,000 maximum, it is here further 
concluded that the "recovery from the state the amount of those 
losses not exceeding $125,000 per claim" means exactly what it 
says. A proper construction of statutory terms must further the 
statute's purpose. The statute's purpose was to limit recovery 
to $125,000. 
b. Traditionally, a judgment creditor cannot 
claim interest prior to the time the debt becomes due and 
certain. When a judgment is reversed on appeal, interest on the 
new judgment subsequently entered by the trial court accrues 
interest on from the date of entry of that new judgment. Mason 
v. Western Mtq. Loan Corp., 754 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1988) Pre 
judgment interest represents an amount awarded as damages due to 
the opposing party's delay in tendering an amount owing under an 
obligation or debt. Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah 
App. 1987). (There is no delay here on the part of the State of 
Utah as it relates to the established debt.) 
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The language of Utah Code Annotated §13-5-2.3 is clear that 
a plaintiff cannot recover, and the state has no liability, until 
the plaintiff has obtained a "successful adjudication". In other 
words, the Nichols are not entitled to recover any amount until a 
judgment is rendered in his or her favor. The state owes no debt 
until the court so declares«. Interest cannot accrue on a 
nonexistent debt! Interest cannot begin to run until the 
plaintiff has a right to the money. The amount of loss is not 
fixed until adjudicatedf and prejudgment interest is not allowed 
in such cases. Bjork v. April Industries, Inc. 560 P.2d 315 
(Utah 1977) cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977). 
Utah law allows post judgment interest to accrue from the 
date of the Judgment. Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 
32 states: 
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a 
judgment for money in a civil case is 
affirmed, any interest allowed by law shall 
be payable from the date the judgment was 
entered in the district court.... 
6. Judgment should be entered in favor of Third Party 
Plaintiff, Carroll C. Nichols for the sum of $125,000.00. 
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7. Judgment should be entered in favor of Third Party 
Plaintiff, Shirley Nichols for the sum of $41,458-57. 
DATED this <s* / day of y*^^7 1989 
JAME^-S. SAWAYA 
District Court Jud 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
BERNARD M. TANNER 
Attorney for Second Third Party 
Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of April, 
1990, a copy of the foregoing Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law and Proposed Final Judgments and Motion for 
Trial Court's Adoption Thereof and Judgment was delivered to 
Robert B, Hansen, Attorney at Law, 838 18th Avenue, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114. 
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